official Philip Giraldi; and Vincent Cannistraro, the former chief of operations of the C. “They were just relentless,” says Wilkerson, who later prepared Colin Powell’s presentation before the United Nations General Assembly. “Your first goal is to make sure it doesn’t find its way back to you, so you do several things.
In addition, has found at least 14 instances prior to the 2003 State of the Union in which analysts at the C. A., the State Department, or other government agencies who had examined the Niger documents or reports about them raised serious doubts about their legitimacy—only to be rebuffed by Bush-administration officials who wanted to use the material. What followed was not just the catastrophic foreign-policy blunder in Iraq but also an ongoing battle for the future of U. “In the world of fabrication, you don’t just drop something and let someone pick it up,” says Bearden.
Nevertheless, the consequences of the robbery were so great that the Watergate break-in pales by comparison. It is forbidden.“A Classic Psy-Ops Campaign”For more than two years it has been widely reported that the U. I.6 intelligence service, and thousands of outlets in the American media to promote the falsehood that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear-weapons program posed a grave risk to the United States. Some of them refer to the Niger documents as “a disinformation operation,” others as “black propaganda,” “black ops,” or “a classic psy-ops [psychological-operations] campaign.” But whatever term they use, at least nine of these officials believe that the Niger documents were part of a covert operation to deliberately mislead the American public. “It serves no other purpose.”By and large, knowledgeable government officials in the U. Official government investigations in Italy, the U. S.—including a two-year probe into pre-war intelligence failures by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence—have been so highly politicized as to be completely unsatisfying. agent Valerie Plame, after Wilson revealed that the Niger story was false. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the former chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney, has already been charged in the case, and President Bush’s senior adviser, Karl Rove, has been Fitzgerald’s other principal target. Accordingly, one can’t probe Nigergate without examining the rich tapestry of intrigue that is Italian intelligence.
A few months after the robbery, Western intelligence analysts began hearing that Saddam Hussein had sought yellowcake—a concentrated form of uranium which, if enriched, can be used in nuclear weapons—from Niger. Embassy in Rome, the State Department, and the White House, as well as several media outlets. The woman tilts her head toward one of the closed doors to indicate that there are people there who can hear. The Bush administration made other false charges about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (W. D.)—that Iraq had acquired aluminum tubes suitable for centrifuges, that Saddam was in league with al-Qaeda, that he had mobile weapons labs, and so forth. has interviewed a number of former intelligence and military analysts who have served in the C. A., the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency (D. Only the ongoing investigation by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald into the Plamegate scandal bears promise. Because Italy emerged from World War II with a strong Communist Party, domestic politics had elements of a civil war, explains Guido Moltedo, editor of a center-left daily in Italy.
The Bush administration invaded Iraq claiming Saddam Hussein had tried to buy yellowcake uranium in Niger. analyst for 27 years; Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, who served in the Pentagon’s Near East and South Asia division in 20; Larry C. And you build in subtle, nuanced errors so you can say, ‘We would never misspell that.’ If it’s very cleverly done, it’s a chess game, not checkers.”Reporters who have entered this labyrinth often emerge so perplexed that they choose not to write about it.